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NATO’s nuclear-sharing arrangements 
often get bad press. This is remarkable 
given the fact that they have demonstrably 
contributed to (a) countering the 
proliferation of nuclear arsenals in Europe, 
(b) fostering alliance cohesion by giving 
non-nuclear weapon states a voice on the 
nuclear posture of the alliance, and (c) 
making nuclear deterrence more effective 
militarily by offering a wider array of force 
options. When the relative merits of 
extended nuclear deterrence are 
unknown, public support thereof is likely 
to suffer. In order to enrich the debate 
about NATO’s nuclear policy, this 
Security Policy Brief articulates the 
threefold logic of nuclear-sharing. 
 
INTRODUCTION  
Nuclear-sharing plays a critical, though little-
understood role in the nuclear posture of the 
NATO alliance. The forward deployment of US 
nuclear weapons in Europe, enabled by delivery 
systems and infrastructure provided by different 
allies, helps cementing the notion that NATO 
will remain a nuclear alliance as long as nuclear 
weapons exist. By extension, it underwrites the 
collective security of its members, which is based 
on a strategy of deterrence and defence. As 
nuclear-sharing makes for a politically sensitive 
subject, public discussion thereof has often 
remained muted. This has resulted in a widening 
gap between what is official policy and the public 
understanding thereof. Yet sustaining leadership 
focus is premised on informing and educating the 
next generation of leaders with consideration and 
deliberation.1 In this sense, the desire to avoid 
difficult debates with critical publics constitutes 
perhaps the gravest risk to NATO’s deterrence 
posture today. 
 
The logic of nuclear-sharing revolves around 
three functions subsumed within the wider 
framework of NATO’s nuclear policy. First 
comes the non-proliferation function: nuclear-
sharing helps maintaining strategic stability by 
limiting the number of nuclear arsenals in 
Europe. Second comes the political cohesion 
function: nuclear-sharing ensures that the 
benefits, responsibilities and risks that derive 
from NATO’s nuclear posture are shared across 
different allies. As such it also provides different 
allies with a voice on nuclear matters that they 
would otherwise lack. Third comes the military 
flexibility function: nuclear-sharing enhances the 
  





strategic effectiveness of nuclear deterrence by 
offering a wider and more credible array of force 
options. Of course, NATO’s nuclear posture 
relies foremost on the triad of US strategic forces, 
as well as on the strategic forces of France and 
the United Kingdom. Not only do these forces 
provide NATO with the means to impose 
unacceptable costs on any adversary, they also 
ensure the ultimate survivability of NATO’s own 
arsenal, especially by continuous at sea deterrence 
and by the quasi-bottomless ‘missile sink’ 
provided by the intercontinental ballistic missile 
force of the US. Yet in today’s environment, in 
which the arms control architecture is eroding, 
and Russian nuclear sabre-rattling has made an 
unwelcome comeback, the different functions 
performed by NATO’s nuclear-sharing 
arrangement are increasing in salience. This 
Egmont Security Policy Brief sets out to 
illuminate these three functions throughout the 
past, present and potential future timeframes.  
 
THE HISTORICAL CONCEPTION OF 
NUCLEAR-SHARING 
In today’s debates about European security it is 
often forgotten that nuclear-sharing originated in 
a very different historical context. The late 1950s 
and early 1960s constituted a timeframe when the 
nuclear deterrence architecture was up for grabs, 
and different European allies contemplated the 
development of nuclear weapons. Nuclear-
sharing came into existence primarily as a 
mechanism to avoid the proliferation of nuclear 
weapons. In addition, allies gradually came to 
appreciate the political and military advantages 
that nuclear-sharing conferred, most notably by 
bolstering the credibility of the US nuclear 
umbrella. Also, it provided allied militaries with 
the needed sense of co-ownership of nuclear 
capability and risk, in combination with 
continuous diplomatic consultations for 
exercising political control. 
 
The sharing of nuclear weapons was originally 
conceived as a way to limit the proliferation of 
European nuclear arsenals.2 Already in 1952, the 
UK became the second Western nation achieving 
nuclear weapon status. Subsequently, under the 
leadership of president Charles de Gaulle, and 
following the loss of confidence in US assistance 
due to the way the Suez crisis unfolded, France 
also embarked on a nuclear weapons programme. 
It detonated its first device in 1960 and chose to 
leave NATO’s military command structure in 
1966. Ever since it has prided itself on its relative 
‘strategic autonomy’, of which the force de frappe 
constitutes the very foundation.3 The accession 
of West Germany to NATO in 1955 and the 
fraught debate over (West-)German rearmament 
brought about intensifying reflection on how to 
curtail the need for NATO allies to 
autonomously provide for their own nuclear 
capabilities. The idea of multilateralising the 
ownership and control of nuclear weapons under 
US leadership logically came to fill the void. 
NATO’s nuclear-sharing arrangements were fully 
integrated into the negotiations leading up to the 
Non-Proliferation Treaty.4 
 
The stationing of US nuclear weapons on the 
territory of its European allies, followed by the 
inclusion of delivery systems owned by allies and 
dual-key control mechanisms also served a 
political purpose in strengthening the credibility 
of extended deterrence. The Gaullist argument 
for developing an independent arsenal was 
premised on doubts whether the US would risk 
the destruction of its own cities on behalf of the 
defence of its allies. Yet by hosting US nuclear 
weapons and by acquiring the means to operate 
and deliver these, the promise of extended 
deterrence became materially tangible. While 
remaining under US control, the allies concerned 
acquired a palpable degree of influence on how 
the nuclear posture of the alliance would evolve 
over time. The creation of the Nuclear Planning 
  





Group in 1966, in parallel to the drafting of the 
Harmel Report, proved instrumental in this 
regard: it provided those allies hosting US nuclear 
weapons with special influence on nuclear 
planning and release authority.5  
 
The involvement of European allies in matters of 
nuclear strategy also acquired military 
significance. The rapid growth of both US and 
Soviet arsenals in terms of the number of 
weapons and delivery systems paved the way for 
an escalation ladder starting with battlefield use 
of nuclear munitions and potentially leading to a 
full-blown exchange between US and Soviet 
intercontinental ballistic missile forces. European 
allies and West Germany in particular developed 
an appreciation for keeping the escalation ladder 
short and steep. Their aim was to avoid becoming 
a nuclear battlefield on which the two 
superpowers could settle their differences 
without risking their own territory. Yet the 
emergence of gaps in the escalation ladder, which 
conferred military advantage to the Soviet Union 
by virtue of its geography, paved the way for the 
granular nuclear architecture of the peak of the 
Cold War, in which different types of shared 
systems all played their part. 
 
THE CURRENT RELEVANCE OF NUCLEAR-
SHARING 
Much of the logic of nuclear-sharing remains 
relevant today. Nuclear-sharing constitutes the 
foundational core of alliance cohesion in the 
nuclear domain: it ties different allies together in 
way that is altogether unique. Different allies 
subscribe to facing the responsibilities, risks and 
burdens that relate to nuclear deterrence 
together. The NATO Nuclear Planning Group – 
from which France continues to abstain – has 
grown into the institutional forum for 
consultation on the nuclear posture of the 
alliance and preparing the associated decisions by 
the North Atlantic Council. The recent evolution 
in declaratory posture codified in the NATO 
summit communiqués from 2014 to 2018 
constitutes ample evident thereof. 
 
Perhaps equally noteworthy is the fact that the 
non-proliferation function of nuclear-sharing, 
which largely disappeared from view, is beginning 
to make a comeback. The critical attitude 
President Trump has espoused towards the 
NATO alliance has fuelled European concerns 
about the credibility of the US extended 
deterrence commitment. While European leaders 
such as German Chancellor Angela Merkel and 
French President Emmanuel Macron have only 
noted the need to assume more responsibility for 
European security, others have already gone 
further by advocating a French-led European 
deterrent or even the development of an 
independent German nuclear arsenal.6 While 
such proposals may fail to gain endorsement for 
a variety of reasons, the fact remains that 
increasing doubts over the credibility of US 
extended deterrence instantaneously translate 
into renewed debate about the need for nuclear 
weapons within different European countries. 
 
Critics frequently but erroneously remark that the 
tactical nuclear weapons delivered by dual 
capable aircraft have no military utility anymore. 
While the political cohesion logic may well have 
been the overriding preoccupation in keeping 
nuclear-sharing in place during the period in 
which Russia was seen to be a partner rather than 
as a competitor, it is equally true that such 
nuclear-sharing continued to have a latent 
function of military flexibility, namely that of 
keeping a minimal level of nuclear capability and 
expertise alive in different allies, pending further 
steps towards disarmament. However, as the 
international security environment has 
deteriorated substantially since 2014, the military 
instrumentality of nuclear-sharing has started to 
increase again, most notably because of the 
  





inherent flexibility dual capable aircraft provide in 
signalling (visually observable) changes to the 
nuclear posture of the alliance. 
 
EXPLORING THE FUTURE OF NUCLEAR-
SHARING 
When it comes to the future, one can only 
speculate about the ways in which the NATO-
Russia relationship may develop, and the 
implications this may have for NATO’s nuclear 
posture. The progressive abandonment of the 
arms control regime built around the INF Treaty 
has triggered NATO deliberations on how to 
respond to Russia’s decision to re-introduce 
intermediate-range ground-launched cruise 
missiles.7 As stated by Secretary-General Jens 
Stoltenberg: “NATO has no intention of 
deploying land-based nuclear missiles in Europe. 
But NATO will always take the necessary steps 
to provide credible and effective deterrence.”8   In 
this context, nuclear-sharing rapidly acquires its 
traditional role of providing both political 
cohesion and military flexibility to the alliance 
without the need for increasing the number of 
independent nuclear arsenals. 
 
Given that threat perceptions vary considerably 
amongst the European allies in function of their 
geographical position on the continent, the need 
to maintain political cohesion remains 
paramount. Nuclear-sharing can be expected to 
play a critical role, precisely because it allows 
different allies to have a voice and some degree 
of ownership of the deterrence posture. Any 
conceivable changes to training, readiness levels, 
basing, infrastructure etc would serve to signal 
political messages within the alliance as well as 
vis-à-vis third parties. In a post-INF world, such 
modularity in responses and messages may be 
precisely what is called for if one wants to avoid 
going back to the tit-for-tat dynamics of the Cold 
War. 
The inherent flexibility of dual capable aircraft 
serves not only a political function, but in case of 
extreme need also a military one. In the 
hypothetical scenario in which the Russian 
Federation would choose nuclear escalation to 
de-escalate a conventional conflict in the 
European theatre, NATO would benefit from 
having credible and proportional counter-strike 
options that do not rely on sea-launched or 
intercontinental ballistic missiles. Dual capable 
aircraft meet this requirement because they allow 
for more gradual escalation (e.g. exercises, 
increased readiness, forward deployment, 
weapons airborne etc). In turn, having these 
options available would prevent such a scenario 
from unfolding in the first place, precisely 
because it has been planned and provided for, 
and thereby deterred. However uncomfortable it 
may appear to contemplate the use of nuclear 
weapons – even on a limited scale – NATO’s 
nuclear-sharing effectively ensures that all allies 
who want to have a say in the Nuclear Planning 
Group get to exercise some degree of influence 
on employment scenarios and release authority. 
In the absence of sharing the burden in a 
multilateral framework, the logical alternative for 
non-nuclear allies is letting the nuclear powers 
decide matters on their own. 
 
CONCLUSION 
The different functions served by NATO’s 
nuclear-sharing prove to be enduring over time. 
Paraphrasing the comments of Secretary-General 
Stoltenberg made about NATO’s seventieth 
anniversary, nuclear-sharing has not lasted so 
many years because of a sense of nostalgia, but 
rather because it is in the national interest of 
every participating ally. This does not mean that 
everything has to remain locked into an eternal 
status quo. If anything, the substantial evolution 
that NATO’s nuclear strategy, posture and 
doctrine has known over the past decades 
provides ample evidence thereof. What it does 
  





mean, is that any changes and alternative schemes 
will need to be evaluated against and compared 
with the existing framework. Any future 
alternative will need to be as logically compelling 
– if not more so – not only in terms of alliance 
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